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I. INTRODUCTION
Since 1998, the Federal Communications Commission's ("FCC's" or "Com-
mission's") E-Rate program has distributed over $10 billion to schools and
libraries for telecommunications improvements, Internet access services, and
internal connection equipment.' While widely acclaimed for connecting our
nation's schools and libraries to the Internet, the program has come under
heavy criticism as a haven for wasteful, corrupt, and fraudulent practices. Re-
cent hearings conducted by the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee
on Oversight and Investigations examined the problem in detail, including the
scheming of several parties who successfully obtained over $48 million in E-
Rate funding grants in the name of the San Francisco Unified School District
without the district's knowledge or authorization.' The conspirators, including
a school district custodial supervisor who purported to act for the district,
rigged a phony competitive bid procurement to favor the conspiring compa-
nies, which more than doubled the already inflated amount of the fraudulent
contracts for E-Rate funding purposes.3 The E-Rate program administrator, an
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I See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATION OF THE H.R. COMM. ON
ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 109TH CONG., REPORT ON WASTE, FRAUD AND ABUSE CONCERNS
WITH THE E-RATE PROGRAM I (Comm. Print 2005) [hereinafter HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE RE-
PORT]. Over $15 billion in funding commitments were issued over this period. The differ-
ence between funding commitments and distributions are those commitments that go unused
by the school or library, in whole or in part, for a variety of reasons.
2 See id. at 19-24 (factoring the San Francisco Unified School District's E-Rate experi-
ence with service providers into the Subcommittee's overall recommendations).
3 Id. at 19-20. According to testimony provided by San Francisco officials and infor-
mation included in the plea agreement, the companies agreed to circumvent any E-Rate
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organization known as the Universal Services Administrative Company
("USAC"), failed to detect the fraud despite subjecting the funding applica-
tions to the most intense level of scrutiny provided for under the USAC pro-
gram integrity review process.4 It was only through the whistle-blowing efforts
of the school district itself that the criminal conspiracy came to light before
funds were actually disbursed.'
In addition to the recent congressional hearings, the Government Account-
ability Office ("GAO") extensively reviewed the operations of the E-Rate pro-
gram and found "an astounding degree of managerial neglect."6 The FCC In-
spector General, in semi-annual reports to Congress, dated as early as 2002,
regularly singled out the E-Rate program as "subject to unacceptably high risk
of malfeasance through noncompliance and program weaknesses."7 The FCC
itself has tightened program rules four times in the past three years in an at-
tempt to clamp down on fraudulent and wasteful practices.8 The Commission is
currently undertaking a major review of program management structural is-
sues9 and it is hard to miss the reports of criminal indictments and convictions
program competition by "rigging the bidding process, submitting fraudulent bids, and prede-
termining who would win," which grossly inflated the cost of work by $26 million. Id.
4 See id.
5 Id. (explaining the school district superintendent's discovery of the unusual nature of
the pending E-Rate program applications and subsequent notification to federal and state
authorities).
6 Id. at 42 (citing Concerns Regarding the Structure and FCC's Management of the E-
Rate Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H.
Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Mark L. Goldstein,
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues) [hereinafter Subcommittee Hearing Statements]).
7 FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS, APRIL 1, 2002-SEPTEMBER 30, 2002, at 9, http://www.fcc.gov/oig/sar902.pdf; see
also FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS, OCTOBER 1, 2004-MARCH 31, 2005, at 3,
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-259144A l .pdf.
8 See In re Schools and Libraries Universal Service Support Mechanism, Second Re-
port and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 9202 (Apr. 30,
2003) ("taking major steps to simplify and streamline the operation" of the universal service
mechanism and improving oversight of the support mechanism); In re Schools and Libraries
Universal Service Support Mechanism, Third Report and Order and Second Further Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 F.C.C.R. 26,912 (Dec. 17, 2003) (adopting rules that limit
schools and libraries from engaging in wasteful or fraudulent practices regarding internal
connections); In re Federal-State Board on Universal Service; Changes to the Board of Di-
rectors for the National Exchange Carrier Association, Inc.; Schools and Libraries Universal
Service Support Mechanism, Order on Reconsideration and Fourth Report and Order, 19
F.C.C.R. 15,252 (July 23, 2004) (granting various petitions for reconsideration of an order
that directed the cancellation of funding commitments made in violation of the 1996 Act); In
re Schools and Libraries Universal Service Support Mechanism, Fifth Report and Order
and Order, 19 F.C.C.R. 15,808 (Aug. 4, 2004) (adopting measures to protect against waste,
fraud, and abuse, particularly from audit activities).
9 Comprehensive Review of Universal Service Fund Management, Administration and
Oversight, 70 Fed. Reg. 41,658 (July 20, 2005) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 54).
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that periodically appear in the press."°
Estimates of possible misuse of funds have ranged up to $180 million annu-
ally and this "might just be the tip of an iceberg."" It is difficult to pinpoint a
more reliable figure. This is in part due to the relatively few funding grants that
have been fully audited. 2 Also, program administrators tend to classify a wide
variety of situations as violations of program rules constituting the misuse of
funds. These violations can range from outright fraudulent schemes to honest
misunderstandings of vague or changing program requirements. 3 But some of
the tawdry schemes and devices uncovered to date speak for themselves. They
include:
" A large-scale marketing effort by one leading technology company to
short-circuit competitive bidding requirements and entice school dis-
tricts to purchase unneeded equipment at grossly inflated prices. 4 Some
believed the pricing would have been indefensible in a public forum and
it was probably only the sheer size of the scam-more than $500 mil-
lion in requested funding for roughly twenty school districts-that led to
its undoing. 5
" The skimming by one service provider of over $1 million in E-Rate
funds for goods and services never provided, most of which were laun-
dered and wired abroad to accounts in Pakistan. 6
" Forgiving or otherwise ignoring through bonus or other arrangements a
10 See, e.g., Telecom Notes, COMM. DAILY, Apr. 7, 2004, at 10 (noting five people were
indicted, and four arrested, on conspiracy, mail fraud, and money laundering charges in
Milwaukee and Chicago); Matt Richtel & Gary Rivlin, NEC Unit Admits It Defrauded
Schools, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2004, at CI (reporting that NEC Business Network Solutions,
a subsidiary of NEC, Inc., pled guilty to two federal felony counts and agreed to pay over
$20 million in fines and restitution, which is the largest E-Rate program settlement to date);
Telecom Notes, COMM. DAILY, Apr. 8, 2005, at 10 (noting a San Francisco federal grand
jury returned a twenty-two-count indictment); Telecom Notes, COMM. DAILY, Feb. 9, 2006,
at 16 (reporting Premio, a California company, agreed to plead guilty to charges involving
FCC E-Rate programs).
I HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 8.
12 See id. at 18 ("[A]ccording to hearing testimony and staff interviews, to date no sta-
tistically representation audit of the E-rate program has been completed to determine the
extent of waste, fraud and abuse.").
13 Id at 12.
14 See id at 24-31. IBM has participated in the E-Rate program since 1998, and since
then has received more the $832 million. In funding year 2002, IBM requested more than $1
billion, almost double the previous year's value, by encouraging school districts to adopt
their concept of a "strategic integrator," which essentially "bundled" millions in ineligible
goods and services. Id. at 25-26.
15 Id.; House Committee Holds Third Hearing on E-Rate Abuse, E-RATE NEWS, Sept.
22, 2004, http://www.fundsforleaming.com/cgi-
bin/NewsList.cgi?world=&section=&rec=555&cat=E-rate.
16 See United States v. Bokhrati, 403 F.3d 861, 862-63 (7th Cir. 2005).
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school's obligation to pay its cost share. 7
Kickbacks to a national school organization for promoting E-Rate
funded sales to members of the organization. 8
The E-Rate program represents the FCC's first attempt to establish and ad-
minister a large-scale multi-billion dollar grant program. Until the implementa-
tion of the E-Rate program, the universal service support mechanism adminis-
tered by the FCC was a more limited program involving far fewer players and
simpler fund transfers among a discrete class of telecommunications compa-
nies. E-Rate vastly expanded the scope and basic nature of this limited subsidy
program to include all public and private Kindergarten-12 schools and librar-
ies nationwide. An unlimited number of potential service providers also joined
the group.
One might reasonably have expected the details of the E-Rate program to
be less than perfect in the beginning. What actually transpired has been far
worse, particularly to the extent in which the program has been open to fraudu-
lent and corrupt schemes-many of which in hindsight appear so obvious that
one wonders how they were allowed to progress as far as they did.
This Article examines three aspects of the E-Rate program where the FCC
has lacked foresight and management. First, program management has lacked
clear lines of responsibility and accountability, particularly between the FCC
and USAC. In theory, the FCC establishes the rules and policies and USAC
only acts as the passive administrator and disbursing agent. In practice, the role
of USAC is far greater. The legalistic "rulemaking" and "appeals" processes
by which the FCC purports to supervise USAC are unwieldy, sometimes inef-
fective, and prone to delay. The program's "management by rule" approach
treats USAC as a subservient and integral division of the FCC, although it is a
largely independent organization. No clear lines of management responsibility
and accountably exist between the FCC and USAC and the actual process by
which they interact is largely closed and non-transparent to the outside world.
Second, while competitive bidding requirements-coupled with the school's
local co-payment obligation-sought to provide an effective cost control
mechanism, the actual requirements adopted by the FCC were at best wishful
words that have resulted in a "form over substance" process. Standing alone,
they have not led to a true competitive bidding process that imposes a reason-
able degree of cost discipline and accountability on applicants and service pro-
viders.
17 House Committee Holds Third Hearing on E-Rate Abuse, supra note 15.
18 See HOUSE SUBCOMMIrrEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 38 (detailing respective roles of
the Atlanta Public School Board and E-Rate program vendors involved in the mismanage-
ment of more than $60 million in funds).
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Finally, the FCC initially set forth only vague and open-ended standards as
to the nature of equipment and services to be funded, leaving it to USAC-
who theoretically only administers the program and has no authority to set pol-
icy-to work out the details. As a result, actual decisions as to what would be
funded and at what cost have tended to be haphazard, subject to arcane and
arbitrary distinctions, and at times downright disingenuous. There is no better
example of this than the present USAC policy allowing funding for the con-
struction of wide area networks ("WANs"), even though the FCC's original
prohibition on the use of E-Rate funds for this purpose is still in place.'9
These are by no means the only problems with the administration of the E-
Rate program. They are, however, indicative of serious design flaws that need
to be candidly addressed if the program is to be ultimately successful in the
prudent administration of the substantial funds entrusted to its care.
II. THE ORIGINS AND STRUCTURE OF THE E-RATE PROGRAM
E-Rate is one of the several universal service programs created by the Tele-
communications Act of 1996 ("1996 Act").2 Specifically, § 254(h) of the Act:
(1) directs the FCC to establish "competitively neutral rules ... to enhance, to
the extent technically feasible and economically reasonable, access to ad-
vanced telecommunications and information services for all public and non-
profit elementary and secondary school classrooms, health care providers and
libraries;"'2 and (2) requires telecommunications carriers to provide services
eligible for universal service support at discounted rates as determined by the
FCC (or the state with respect to intrastate services) as "appropriate and neces-
sary to ensure affordable access to and use of such services by such entities.
22
As summarized in the 1996 Act's Congressional Conference Report, Congress
intended that "elementary and secondary school classrooms, and libraries have
affordable access to modem telecommunications services that ...will help
open new worlds of knowledge, learning and education to all Americans-rich
19 A wide area network is defined as "voice, data, or video network that provides con-
nections from one or more computers or networks within an eligible school or library to one
or more computers or networks that are external to such eligible school or library." Wide
Area Network (WAN) Fact Sheet,
http://www.universalservice.org/sl/applicants/step06/wide-area-network-fact-sheet.aspx
(last visited Feb. 2, 2006).
20 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 505, 110 Stat. 56, 136
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § § 151-170 (2000)).
21 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(2) (detailing advanced telecommunications services for certain
providers).
22 Id. § 254(h)(1)(B) (detailing telecommunications services for educational providers
and libraries).
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and poor, rural and urban."23 Congress chose, however, not to accompany these
lofty goals with a specific implementing plan. Ultimately, Congress delegated
authority to the FCC and a Federal-State Joint Board ("Joint Board"), estab-
lished by the 1996 Act to advise the FCC, to develop a system to bring these
goals to fruition.14 The 1996 Act expressly gives the Commission broad author-
ity to "enhance, to the extent technically feasible and economically reasonable,
access to advanced telecommunications and information services for all ...
school class-rooms ... and libraries. 25
As finally structured by the Joint Board and the FCC, the E-Rate program is
administered by USAC, a not-for-profit corporation charged by the Commis-
sion to administer all universal service programs.26 USAC is a subsidiary of the
National Exchange Carrier Association ("NECA"), also a not-for-profit corpo-
ration formed in 1983 by telecommunications carriers, acting under the direc-
tion of the FCC. NECA was tasked with administering the access tariff struc-
ture developed after the break-up of AT&T. 2' Although USAC is technically a
NECA subsidiary, by express FCC rule, NECA is prohibited from participating
in the functions or management of USAC. Indeed, the only role played by
NECA is that of a subcontractor providing various data processing and other
services to USAC.28
USAC is charged only with the administration of the program and has no
power to establish program rules and policies. These policies are set by the
FCC in codified rules, various policy pronouncements, and specific USAC
funding actions appealed to the FCC.2" In this respect, the USAC-FCC rela-
tionship is structured as though USAC is an integral bureau or division of the
23 H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 132 (1996) (Conf. Rep.); see S. REP. No. 104-230, at 132
(1996) (Conf. Rep.).
24 47 U.S.C. § 254(a)(1). The Federal-State Joint Board is comprised of FCC Commis-
sioners, State Utility Commissioners, and a consumer advocate representative. See FCC
Universal Service, Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service,
http://www.fcc.gov/wcb/universal-service/JointBoard/welcome.html (last visited Feb. 4,
2006).
25 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(2)(A).
26 See In re Changes to the Board of Directors of the National Exchange Carrier Asso-
ciation, Inc., Third Report and Order in CC Docket No. 97-21, Fourth Order on Reconsid-
eration in CC Docket No. 97-21 and Eighth Order on Reconsideration in CC Docket No.
96-45, 13 F.C.C.R. 25,058, 2 (Nov. 19, 1998) [hereinafter USAC Third Report and Order].
27 Id. 5; see also NECA-About Us, http://www.neca.org/source/NECA-AboutUs.asp
(last visited Dec. 22, 2005).
28 47 C.F.R. § 54.703(a) (2005). Thus, as discussed hereinafter in more detail, NECA
has no role in the appointment of the USAC Board of Directors, which by FCC rule is com-
posed of representatives of the telecommunications industry, and other industries interested
in the operation of USAC. See id. §§ 54.703(b)-(c).
29 See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GREATER INVOLVEMENT NEEDED BY FCC IN THE MAN-
AGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT OF THE E-RATE PROGRAM 5-8 (2005) [hereinafter GAO REPORT],
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05151 .pdf.
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FCC, although it is a separate non-governmental legal entity. Funding for all
universal service programs, including E-Rate, comes from levies paid into the
Universal Service Fund ("USF") by telecommunications carriers. The costs of
contributing to these programs are gathered from consumers, usually through
monthly phone bill line item charges.3" Universal service funds are not subject
to the federal government budgetary process and are held outside of U.S. De-
partment of Treasury standards.3
The FCC adopted rules for the E-Rate program in 1997. These rules estab-
lished three broad categories of Services and equipment eligible for E-Rate
support: telecommunications services; Internet access services; and the instal-
lation and maintenance of internal connection equipment.32 However, the FCC
provided little specific definition as to the precise equipment and services that
might be encompassed in these general categories.33 The rules fix no cap on the
funding that applicants may request each year, so long as the equipment and
services fall within a "technology plan" approved by a state educational au-
thority.34 Consequently, oversight of cost and reasonableness of an applicant's
"technology plan" is placed in the hands of entities having no responsibility or
incentive to control costs.35
With regard to the financial administration, the FCC implemented competi-
tive bidding requirements to maintain fiscal discipline.36 These requirements
include a provision requiring applicants to pay a pro rata share of the overall
program cost, ranging from 10% to 80% depending on the poverty level of the
community served by the school or library.33 In addition to requiring adherence
30 See HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 6.
31 See id. at 44. Given the current USAC funds structure, it has been especially difficult
to determine what applicable laws and regulations govern the administration of program
funds, including the applicability of federal government accounting and investment stan-
dards, as opposed to generally accepted business practices. In early fall 2004, the confusion
resulted in the loss of approximately $4.6 million in USAC funds. Due to a last-minute FCC
directive to change to federal government accounting and other financial management stan-
dards, there arose a need to prematurely liquidate certain investment holdings. Id.
32 47 C.F.R. §§ 54.502-.503.
33 See id. For example, one could discern from the initial rules that the cabling, routers
and other equipment necessary to connect school classrooms to the Internet access service
drop off point on the outside of the school building would be eligible for funding, whereas
asbestos removal within the school to do the cabling would not. In comparison, the FCC
now annually promulgates a specific eligible services list, often over sixty pages long. See
id. § 54.522; Pleading Cycle Established for Eligible Services List for Universal Service
Mechanism for Schools and Libraries, Public Notice, 19 F.C.C.R. 16,013 (Aug. 13, 2004).
34 An annual cap of $2.25 billion applies to all requests, but within that the FCC can
determine freely how to allocate these resources among the state-approved "technology
plans." See 47 C.F.R. §§ 54.507-.508.
" See id. § 54.508(c).
36 Id. § 54.504(a).
37 See id. § 54.505.
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to whatever local competitive bidding requirements might apply, the FCC es-
tablished an Intemet-based "competitive bidding" process under which the
applicant is required to post a description of its service needs on the USAC
website and wait twenty-eight days before actually entering into a contract
with the service provider.38 The FCC rules require the applicant to "carefully
consider" all bids received in response to the web posting and select the "most
cost effective" bid, taking actual cost into account as only one of several fac-
tors.39 The FCC expressly designed these requirements to give applicants
"maximum discretion" to select the proposal best meeting their particular tech-
nology needs.
The actual application process is designed to be as automated as possible
through the use of electronic filing procedures. While FCC rules originally
contemplated that schools would be able to file applications at any time of the
year depending on their particular procurement practices, an annual funding
cap for the total E-Rate program of $2.25 billion has in practice resulted in a
tight "window" filing requirement each year.4" Applications typically must be
filed in an approximate ninety-day period from November through January
proceeding each funding year, which runs from July 1 through June 30." If
requested funding in a year ("demand") exceeds the annual funding cap ("sup-
ply"), the FCC rules ration available funds among successful applicants by
restricting funding for internal connection equipment, so-called "Priority Two"
services, to the most needy schools.4 2 Typically, this has meant that only
schools qualifying for very high subsidies of 80% or higher receive funding for
internal connection equipment. These types of subsidies account for the largest
number of funding requests.43
Not only was this a completely new and untried structure, but the FCC rules
also significantly opened the USF door beyond regulated telecommunication
carriers to any potential Internet access service provider or seller of equip-
ment. 4 In hearing an appeal on this issue, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
38 See id. § 54.511; Universal Service Administrative Company, Open a Competitive
Bidding Process (Form 470), http://www.universalservice.org/sl/applicants/step03 (describ-
ing in detail the process and requirements for interested applicants and service providers)
(last visited Mar. 15, 2006).
39 47 C.F.R. § 54.511.
40 See id. § 54.507.
41 E.g., Wireline Competition Bureau Announces the Filing Window for Funding Year
2005 FCC Form 471 E-Rate Applications, Public Notice, 19 F.C.C.R. 22,085 (Nov. 9,
2004); see HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 6.
42 See HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 6; 47 C.F.R. § 54.507. "Priority
One" services include telecommunications and Internet access fees, while "Priority Two"
services account for all other applicant funding requests. See HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE RE-
PORT, supra note 1, at 6.
43 See HOUSE SUBCOMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 6.
44 See Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393, 408 (5th Cir. 1999).
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Fifth Circuit narrowly sustained the new rules.45 The court agreed that "the
statute and its legislative history do not support the FCC's interpretation" that
non-telecommunications services and equipment are eligible for support.
6
Nonetheless, the court deferred to the FCC's different interpretation because
"the language of the statute is ambiguous enough to require deference under
Chevron step-two."'47 The basic mechanics of the USF thus substantially
changed from a subsidy mechanism among telecommunications carriers, under
which carriers were required to discount their services to certain customers and
recoup those discounts through offsetting reductions in their fund contribu-
tions, to a new scheme, whereby virtually any entity could draw funds from the
USF.
II. A BYZANTINE PROGRAM MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE HINDERS
EFFECTIVE PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
In deciding to create a not-for-profit, unaffiliated corporation to administer
the E-Rate program, the FCC reasoned that such an organizational structure
would "provide for greater accountability and more efficient administration"
than utilizing a subcontractor.48 The original plan required NECA, as the tem-
porary program administrator, to establish under Delaware law a separate non-
profit corporation, the Schools and Libraries Corporation ("SLC"), to adminis-
ter only the E-Rate program. 9 The FCC intended that the SLC would eventu-
ally become "independent of, and unaffiliated with, NECA and USAC."5 ° This
was the Commission's first organizational misstep.
Critical of the Commission's authority to create the SLC, Senator Ted Ste-
vens requested that the GAO examine the establishment of the SLC.5 The
GAO concluded that "the Commission lacked authority to direct the [NECA]
to create SLC .... "52 In response to the GAO letter, Congress requested that
the Commission submit a report and "propose a new structure for the imple-
45 Id. at 449.
46 Id. at 440.
47 Id. One of the members of the three judge panel would have overturned the rules on
constitutional grounds, had the issue been raised by the petitioners, as an unconstitutional
tax unapproved by Congress. Id. at 440 n.86.
48 In re Changes to the Board of Directors of the National Exchange Carrier Associa-
tion, Inc. Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Report and Order and Second
Order on Reconsideration, 12 F.C.C.R. 18,400, 57 (July 17, 1997) (emphasis added).
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Report in Response to Senate Bill 1768 and Conference Report on H.R. 3579, Report
to Congress, 13 F.C.C.R. 11,810, 11,811 n.3 (May 8, 1998).
52 Id.
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mentation of the universal service programs."53 Congress's intended to have a
single entity administering all of the universal service programs.54 As requested
by Congress, in 1998, the Commission eliminated the SLC and gave USAC
oversight of the E-Rate program, along with all other universal service pro-
grams.5 In the Commission's words, this new consolidated structure "may best
further the goals of efficient administration and accountability" of the E-Rate
program.56
USAC, while technically a subsidiary of NECA, is governed by a nineteen-
member board of directors composed of representatives of the various con-
stituencies interested in the operation of USAC.57 Each constituency group is
required to "nominate by consensus" their representative or representatives. 8
The Chairman of the FCC accepts nominations and holds the actual power and
responsibility to appoint all board members.59 The USAC Board appoints
USAC's Chief Executive Officer ("CEO"). The FCC Chairman must concur
in the appointment. USAC's CEO holds all management responsibility for
program administration. The Commission had originally declined to "divest"
USAC from NECA for fear that Congress had not authorized such action.
Nevertheless, given the GAO's legal findings that the FCC did not have the
authority to create the SLC, the practical effect of this unusual structural ar-
rangement led to divestiture. Essentially, the FCC divested NECA of any abil-
ity to manage USAC and placed the power in different hands. Calling a non-
profit corporation like USAC, that has no stock ownership with voting rights or
profit-distribution among its owners, a subsidiary of another corporation is a
meaningless legal fiction. Rather, the more important consideration is the
power to direct the affairs and management of the non-profit corporation-in
this case that power shifted, with no clear lines of management control and
accountability, to a mostly volunteer board of "stakeholders" representing the
various interests involved in the USF transfer process.
While such a "club-like" management structure might have been appropriate
for a tightly-knit group with a common interest, it is not the best way to man-
53 Id. at 11,810 n.l1.
54 Id. at 11,810 n.2.
55 id. T 8.
56 Id. (emphasis added).
57 See 47 C.F.R. § 54.703 (2005). The USAC Board is apportioned among representa-
tives of: incumbent local exchange carriers (3), interexchange carriers (2), commercial mo-
bile radio service providers (1), competitive local exchange carriers (1), cable operators (1),
information service providers (1), schools (3), libraries (1), rural health care providers (2),
low income consumers (1), state telecommunications regulators (1) state consumer advo-
cates (1), and the USAC CEO. Id.
58 Id.
59 See id. § 53.703(c)(3).
60 See id. § 53.704.
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age what is, effectively, a massive financial institution doing business with
diverging and conflicting interests groups. In this respect, the immense sums
collected and disbursed by USAC cannot be overstated. In 2003, USAC col-
lected over $5.8 billion and dispersed $5.3 billion to recipients of its various
programs. 6' If USAC were a for-profit corporation, its revenues would make it
the 314th largest corporation in America, larger than Cox Communications,
Inc. and Barnes and Noble, Inc., and slightly smaller than Southwest Airlines
Co.
6 2
In requiring the FCC to merge the SLC into USAC, Congress also provided
guidance on the appropriate roles of the Commission and USAC.63 Specifi-
cally, the Senate bill limited the role of USAC to implementing Commission
rules and provided that USAC "may not administer the programs in any man-
ner that requires that entity to interpret the intent of Congress in establishing
the programs or interpret any rule promulgated by the Commission in carrying
out the programs, without appropriate consultation and guidance from the
Commission."' In other words, Congress intended to limit the role of USAC to
the day-to-day administration of the E-Rate program, including such activities
as processing funding applications and the disbursement process, and subject
to FCC direction as to all policy matters and rule interpretation.65
USAC is neither a component branch of the FCC nor a government corpora-
tion established by Congress. Although obligated, like any member of the pub-
lic, to comply with FCC orders and rules, USAC has no other contractual or
legally enforceable obligations or standards of performance.66 In this respect,
according to the GAO, "USAC operates and disburses funds under less explicit
federal ties than many other federal programs."67
With no clear lines of control or management or operational responsibility
between the FCC and USAC, the net effect has been to rely on the rulemaking
and appellate processes as the primary management and oversight mecha-
nism.68 Unfortunately, the rulemaking process was not designed as a technique
61 See UNIVERSAL SERV. ADMIN. Co., 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 17 [hereinafter USAC 2004
ANNUAL REPORT], http://www.universalservice.org/_res/documents/about/pdf/2004-annual-
report.pdf (reporting on cash flows from operating activities in 2003).
62 See List of Fortune 500, USA TODAY, Mar. 22, 2004,
http://www.usatoday.com/money/companies/2004-03-22-fortune-500-listx.htm (reporting
on the 2003 revenue of Fortune 500 corporations).
63 See S. 1768, 105th Cong. § 2005(b)(2)(A) (1998); USAC Third Report and Order,
supra note 26, 15 (recommending the limitations on USAC's authority, including the re-
quirement of the submission of an annual report to foster greater accountability).
64 S. 1768 § 2005(b)(2)(A).
65 See GAO REPORT, supra note 29, at 8.
66 See id. at 12.
67 Id.
68 Id.
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or method to manage government grant programs involving large fund trans-
fers.69 In practice, it has proven to be rather ineffective and incapable of provid-
ing the "hands on" day-to-day direction and rapid response to newly arising
issues necessary to effective program management. 0 For example, as one re-
sponse to the growing fraud problem, in August 2004, the FCC through the
rulemaking process formally directed USAC "to submit to the Commission
within 45 days from publication in the Federal Register, and annually thereaf-
ter, a list summarizing all current USAC administrative procedures . . . that
serve to protect against waste, fraud and abuse."7 Intended to serve as the basis
for further FCC "binding rules" for the recovery of improperly disbursed
funds, this matter still remains under review eighteen months later.72 Moreover,
particularly given the generally vague program rules adopted by the Commis-
sion, it was somewhat nai've to think that the division between "policy making
and interpretation" and "administration" could be so cleanly divided between
two different organizations.73 Without some interpretation on an ongoing basis,
USAC could not perform its administrative duties on a day-to-day basis.
This "management by rule" approach might have had some chance of suc-
cess if it were accompanied by an effective mechanism for the prompt resolu-
tion of issues of rule interpretation, matters of dispute on particular funding
questions, and the myriad of other unanswered questions that were bound to
arise in the administration of the program. This was to be accomplished
through an appellate process, as all interested parties hold the right to appeal
any USAC action to the FCC and obtain a prompt decision.74 Originally, the
rules provided for either a decision on any appeal within forty-five days or the
automatic granting of the appeal, but subsequent modifications eliminated the
automatic grant mechanism to require FCC action within ninety days, extend-
able to 180 days by specific order of the FCC.75
Again, however, the process has not worked as intended. According to the
GAO, "the FCC resolves appeals too slowly, and has a very large backlog of
69 See HouSE SUBCOMMITEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 1-2.
70 See id. at 2 ("The FCC's three key oversight mechanisms for the E-rate program-
rulemaking procedures, beneficiary audits, and reviews of USAC decisions (i.e., appeals
decisions)-are not sufficient to manage the program.").
71 In re Schools and Libraries Universal Service Support Mechanism, supra note 8,
80.
72 In re Comprehensive Review of Universal Service Fund Management, Administra-
tion, and Oversight; Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service; Schools and Libraries
Universal Service Support Mechanism; Rural Health Care Support Mechanism; Lifeline and
Link-Up; Changes to the Board of Directors for the National Exchange Carrier Association,
Inc., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20
F.C.C.R. 11,308, 22 (June 9, 2005).
73 Subcommittee Hearing Statements, supra note 6, at 1.
74 See 47 C.F.R. § 54.719 (2005).
75 See id. § 54.724.
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appeals . . . . This adds uncertainty to the program . . . and raises the risk of
both wasted funding opportunities and wasteful spending. 76 Despite the 180
day deadline for deciding appeals, many have languished at the FCC for years
with no action."
The process by which the FCC has avoided the 180-day decision deadline is
in itself an interesting commentary on the administrative laxness of the pro-
gram. Until recently, as required by 47 C.F.R. § 54.724, the Wireline Competi-
tion Bureau has carefully issued procedural orders extending the ninety-day
period for decision in sixty to thirty day increments up to the ultimate 180-day
deadline, but then simply ignores the more fundamental 180 decisional re-
quirement.7 8 Even the issuance of procedural extension orders of the ninety-day
requirement seems to have fallen into disuse recently. For USAC, as the entity
charged with the ongoing administration of the program, this leaves important
questions unanswered and fails to provide needed management direction in an
efficient and timely manner. As a result, USAC is often placed in the position
of having to craft answers on its own either through administrative policy ac-
tions or by its own inaction, both of which contribute to a certain level of insti-
tutional paralysis in the program's responsiveness to changing conditions and
developing problems.
79
The overall result of this rather loose and diffuse management structure is an
organization that appears to be largely disconnected from the FCC in terms of
the day-to-day "hands on" management and policy oversight necessary for the
program's effective functioning. This leaves USAC in a somewhat "orphan-
like" situation, charged on one hand with tremendous responsibilities but on
the other hand unable to act decisively on many matters. Hampered from the
start by "lingering questions concerning [USAC's] organization and structure,"
the basic program management arrangement fashioned by the FCC does not
work as intended, to the detriment of a well-intentioned program." In the
words of the House Subcommittee Report, unfortunately USAC has been
76 HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 46 (noting that 527 appeals were
pending as of February 2005, although the number is probably greater at this time as rela-
tively few appeals have been resolved since the Subcommittee's findings).
77 See, e.g., In re Requests for Review of the Decision of the Universal Service Admin-
istrator by Birch Run Area Schools, et al., Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 4095, 2 (Feb. 28, 2005)
[hereinafter Birch Run Area Schools Order] (extending time period to take action by an
additional sixty days); In re Requests for Review of the Decision of the Universal Service
Administrator by Anchorage School District, et al., Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 4093, 2 (Feb. 28,
2005) [hereinafter Anchorage School District Order].
78 See, e.g., Birch Run Area Schools Order, supra note 77, 2 (extending time period to
take action by an additional sixty days); Anchorage School District Order, supra note 77,
2.
79 See HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 45.
80 See id. at 42.
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"poorly managed" by the FCC, raising substantial questions of "whether con-
trol and management of... [such a large program] is appropriately delegated
to a non-government entity.""
IV. E-RATE COMPETITIVE BIDDING REQUIREMENTS HAVE BEEN
WISHFUL AND INEFFECTIVE
In order to ensure honesty and prevent excessive price gouging, the E-Rate
program utilizes a competitive bidding process coupled with the specific
school's obligation to pay its share of the contract price, which ranges from
10% to 80% depending on the school's poverty level.8" While both require-
ments sound good in theory, both have proven largely ineffective in preventing
abusive and fraudulent practices. 3 In addition to whatever local procurement
requirements may apply, the FCC established an Internet-based notification
process which requires the school to post a description of desired services on
the USAC website and wait at least twenty-eight days before contracting with
a service provider. 4 FCC rules do no more than require the school to "carefully
consider" any bids received and select the "most cost effective" bid.85
These loose and vague requirements have by and large failed to create a true
competitive bidding process for E-Rate funded services. The obligation to post
services desired online is so loosely defined and enforced that the results are
vague and general postings fail to solicit "bids" in any real sense of that term.
Even if fairly specific bids do result, schools have substantial freedom to select
whichever service provider they want for arbitrary reasons. "Cost effective"
has not meant "low price" in the FCC's scheme of things; rather the FCC's
rules specifically invite the school to give decisive weight to any other factors.
While the FCC has recently raised its level of rhetoric and implored schools to
show more prudence when considering pricing factors, the "most cost effec-
tive" standard still remains far too vague and subjective to be enforceable from
a practical standpoint.
The only competitive bid requirement that USAC and the FCC have been
able to enforce with some regularity is the required twenty-eight day pre-
81 Id. at3.
82 See 47 C.F.R. § 54.505 (2005).
83 See HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 10-19 (analyzing the E-Rate
program discounts for Puerto Rico Department of Education's management of its public
schools, and the apparent funding and planning problems).
84 See 47 C.F.R. § 54.511 (stating the selection requirements for providers of eligible
services, and deeming the competitive bidding process operational when the Administrator
accepts and posts FCC Form 470s for universal use); Id. § 54.504(b) (requiring all eligible
schools and libraries to submit Form 470, including specific information on the necessary
equipment and connections).
85 Id. § 54.511.
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contracting waiting period. Unfortunately, this has further contributed to a
process that is largely form over substance. Schools that allow their pre-
selected, program-savvy service provider to prepare their funding application
probably encounter less actual risk of dismissal than the honest applicant at-
tempting to navigate complex filing requirements on its own who gets a date
wrong. Consider the plight of Our Lady of Refuge, an inner-city parochial
school in the Bronx, New York.86 The FCC ordered the school to return two
years of E-Rate funding discounts when, after voluntarily submitting the in-
formation in support of a subsequent application, the Commission discovered
the school's Internet service contract was dated one day earlier than reflected
in the USAC database. 7
Similarly, adventurous parties have implemented a variety of practices to
circumvent the local share payment obligation, ranging from simply ignoring
or forgiving the payment obligation to complex schemes designed to create the
appearance of a payment.88 The school must certify that it will pay its share and
the USAC application process examines, sometimes in excruciating detail, the
basis for this certification.89 However, after granting the E-Rate funding appli-
cation, no process or procedure apparently exists for conditioning or coordinat-
ing the disbursement of E-Rate funds on the actual payment of the local share.
Short of a full after-the-fact audit of the completed funding (done in very few
cases to date), the actual policing of this important part of the process is sorely
lacking.
In 1999, soon after the start of the E-Rate program, the FCC had a chance to
strengthen these requirements.98 However, rather than impose some cost disci-
pline, the FCC signaled a "hands-off' approach that largely trusted schools and
service providers to do the right thing. In a unanimous decision, the FCC over-
ruled a USAC decision to deny E-Rate funding and directed USAC to grant
funding to the state of Tennessee to develop a statewide Internet service net-
work.9
86 See In re Request for Review of the Decision of the Universal Service Administrator
by Our Lady of Refuge School, Order, 17 F.C.C.R. 5754, 7 (Mar. 27, 2002) (denying
request for review because contract was signed one day prior to the end of the twenty-eight-
day waiting period).
87 See id.
88 See HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 21, 34 ("NEC, BNS, and VNCI
'waived' the school districts' co-payments, despite clear FCC and USAC guidance that this
was prohibited" and proposed inflation of bid costs "so that sufficient margin would be
available to cover . . . co-payment" and offer of "interest-free loan to cover ... co-
payment").
89 See 47 C.F.R. § 54.507.
90 See In re Request for Review by the Department of Education of the State of Tennes-
see of the Decision of the Universal Service Administrator, Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 13,734
(Aug. 11, 1999) [hereinafter 1999 Tennessee Order].
91 See id. 1. Despite the decision being unanimous, then Commissioner Furchgott-
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The decision was precipitated by charges filed with the FCC and USAC by a
losing bidder who alleged that the contract award and ensuing E-Rate funding
request violated both the obligation to select the most cost-effective bid and
pay the appropriate local cost share.92 In several key respects, the FCC's reso-
lution of these charges set the tone for the subsequent direction of the E-Rate
program. Measured by any objective standard, the FCC's decision stretched
the definition of cost effectiveness beyond what is reasonable. The winning bid
was approximately $23 million more than the losing bid for essentially the
same package of goods and Internet access services over a three-year period.93
The state found that both bidders met the basic qualifications and compara-
tively evaluated the two parties using a numerical forty-five point system, un-
der which the winning bidder prevailed on the basis of both technical approach
(33.375 points versus twenty-six points for the losing bidder) and cost (thirty
points versus 20.837 points for the losing bidder).94
The preference awarded to the winning bidder for cost efficiency, despite
its substantially higher bid price, was particularly novel. Rather than measure
price considerations on the basis of overall cost, the state used a formula ex-
pressly designed to prefer the bidder who achieved the greatest dollar amount
of E-Rate funding, based on a fixed amount of spending by the state.95 In other
words, so long as the state's cost remained the same, a larger price of the over-
all contract and a greater cost-bidding would result in preference to the bidder.
Nonetheless, the FCC found that "Tennessee adequately considered price, as
well as other factors, in determining the most cost-effective bid."9 Placing vir-
tually complete reliance on the expectancy that local and state competitive bid-
ding requirements should be sufficient "to ensure compliance with [FCC]
competitive bid requirements," the FCC saw no problem with a competitive
bidding approach that, on its face, favored the high price bid: "although the
Roth approved in part, concurred in part, and dissented in part, with a statement to be re-
leased at a later date. His promised statement, however, was never released so his specific
concerns are unknown.
92 See id 4-5. It should be noted that one of the Authors of this article served as
counsel to the protesting party before the FCC and USAC, and all information herein is
from the public record.
93 See Tennessee State Department of Education Application (FCC Form 471) for Ap-
proval of Funding, Objection to Application and Request for Expedited Declaratory Ruling,
CC Docket No. 96-45, at 6 (Apr. 3, 1998) [hereinafter ISIS Objection to Application] (not-
ing the winning bid amounted to $74,352,941, versus a $51,275,384 bid from the losing
bidder) (available via FCC Electronic Comment Filing System).
94 See In re Request for Review by Integrated Systems and Network Solutions, Inc. of
Decision of Universal Service Administrator, Request for Review in Part of Fund Adminis-
trator's Explanation for Funding Commitment Decisions, CC Docket No. 96-45, at 6-7
(Mar. 19, 1999) (available via FCC Electronic Comment Filing System).
95 See 1999 Tennessee Order, supra note 90, 12-14.
96 See id 16.
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formula used to evaluate cost may have awarded the highest points for cost to
bids maximizing federal support, this is not prohibited by our rules."97 The
FCC thus blessed a competitive bidding approach that rewarded the higher-
priced bidder for that reason alone.
This, however, did not end the FCC's apparent reluctance to examine cost
issues and exert a reasonable degree of oversight. Another unusual feature of
the winning contract was a transaction involving the transfer to the winning
bidder of certain "software and the right to use certain components of the exist-
ing WAN owned and used by the schools of Tennessee, the ConnecTEN net-
work[,] " in exchange for Internet access service using the network.98 Specifi-
cally, the complainant alleged that the transaction violated FCC rules in two
distinct ways. First, the complainant argued that funding was being improperly
sought for pre-existing WAN facilities.99 The second argument maintained that
the transaction was essentially a wash that created the appearance of a local
share payment.' ° For E-Rate funding purposes, the application used the $7.5
million due to the state for its existing network rights as part of the state's pay-
ment of its share of the contract price, even though it was apparently offset by
the winning bidder's charges for Internet access service using the equipment.''
This was not a new or novel financial device. For over twenty years, the
federal Medicaid program has also struggled with basically the same problem.
Medicaid, like E-Rate, is a shared cost program in which the federal govern-
ment absorbs a certain percentage of each state's overall program costs.0 2 In
order to increase the federal share above the set cost percentage, states previ-
ously used such devices as "provider donations" or special "provider-specific
taxes" that allow a health care provider to donate money or pay a special tax to
the state.' °3 This money is then immediately returned to the facility in the form
of higher-than-normal payments for Medicaid supported services. The higher-
than-normal expense payments are then used as the basis of calculating the
federal Medicaid reimbursement amount, thereby increasing the percentage of
the state's actual Medicaid expenses paid by the federal government. Accord-
ing to Gail Wilensky, Administrator for the Health Care Financing Administra-
tion, "they are 'carefully crafted' finance techniques that allow states to reduce
97 Id. 10, 14.
90 Id. 15.
99 See id.
100 Id.
'0' See ISIS Objection to Application, supra note 93, at 28-29.
102 See 42 U.S.C. § 1346 (2000) (providing for annual appropriation of funds to qualify-
ing states for medical assistance programs).
103 See NAT'L HEALTH POLICY FORUM, THE FEDERAL-STATE MEDICAID MATCH: AN ON-
GOING TUG-OF-WAR OVER PRACTICE AND POLICY, ISSUE BRIEF No. 760, at 5-6 (2000),
http://www.nhpf.org/pdfs_ib/IB760_MedicaidMatch 12-15-00.pdf.
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their share of Medicaid costs and force the federal government to pay more."
The FCC, however, apparently limited its inquiry to only the first half of the
problem, holding that the charges for Internet access services using the Con-
necTEN equipment were ineligible for funding because such "components
were part of an ineligible WAN when owned by Tennessee."'' 5 The Order was
silent as to the second allegation. Because USAC operations are conducted
largely off the public record, it is difficult to determine exactly how these is-
sues were subsequently handled by USAC on remand from the FCC. Certain
information, however, is ascertainable from the USAC public database. For the
first program year, USAC ultimately granted Education Networks of America,
inc. ("ENA") $22,743,258 in E-Rate funding.' 6 The state's maximum contri-
bution of approximately $5 million specified in the contract should have re-
sulted in E-Rate funding of $11 million at the most, assuming the 69% dis-
count rate ultimately allowed.0 7 It would thus appear that USAC also failed to
examine this aspect of the transaction.
In hindsight, the FCC lost an opportunity to implement effective program
cost control requirements. Not only was the winning bid more than 50% higher
than the losing bid, it was undisputed that the state's Request for Proposal and
bid evaluation formula was expressly designed to favor the higher priced bid.
The state specifically sought "creative approaches" to maximize the amount of
E-Rate funding obtainable in return for a fixed expenditure by the state-the
higher the overall contract price, the greater the preference to the bidder on
cost factors. And in the center of the arrangement was an unusual transaction
that allegedly inflated the size of the state's contribution for E-Rate funding
purposes. It is hard to imagine a more target-rich environment.
Since then, the FCC has come to realize that more effective competitive
bidding requirements are necessary, but its response still relies more on rheto-
ric and the "bully pulpit" rather than clear requirements. In 2003, in a series of
cases arising out of the same scheme, the FCC affirmed USAC's denial of
104 Id. at 7 (citing Financing Medicaid Through Provider Taxes and Intergovernmental
Transfers: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong. 3 (Oct.
16, 1991) (statement of Gail R. Wilensky, Administrator, Health Care Financing Admini-
stration)). Congress restricted these practices in the Medicaid Voluntary Contribution and
Provider-Specific Tax Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-234, 105 Stat. 1793.
105 1999 Tennessee Order, supra note 90, 17.
106 See Universal Service Administrative Company, Schools and Libraries, Funding Re-
quest Data Retrieval Tool,
http://www.sl.universalservice.org/funding/opendatasearch/Search l.asp (last visited Apr. 4,
2006). The search criteria performed to determine USAC's Committed Amount for ENA
included the 1998 Funding Year, State of Tennessee, and BEN number 128260. Addition-
ally, the following data points were selected: Applicant's Name; Billed Entity Number
(BEN); Service Provider Name; and Total Charges under the Discount Funding Request
Data. Id.
107 See ISIS Objection to Application, supra note 93, at 7-8, attachments F, H.
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funding applications from eight school districts requesting approximately $250
million in total funding for violating program competitive bidding require-
ments." 8 The Commission, acknowledging that it created some ambiguity in
holding that price was "a primary factor" in the Tennessee decision, decreed
that price "must be the primary factor in considering bids."' 9 The FCC ex-
plained, "For example, if in selecting bids an applicant assigns 10 points for
reputation, 10 points to past experience, and 10 points to timing considerations,
it must assign at least 11 points to price."''0
While somewhat narrowing the boundary, this still is a loose and largely
subjective standard that continues to leave the determination of fair pricing to
the vagaries of the USAC application evaluation process. The difficulties re-
cently encountered by the State of Wyoming due to the new standard aptly
illustrate the problem."' It was undisputed that Wyoming, through a competi-
tive bidding process mandated by state law, had in fact selected the lowest
priced bid, lower by several million dollars according to the record." 2 How-
ever, because the state's bid criteria in the initial RFP assigned more weight to
the need for system functionality (30%) than to price (20%), Wyoming's
statewide application was denied by USAC on the grounds that this demon-
strated price was not the primary factor in the selection process."' In so doing,
USAC ignored not only the actual pricing in the bids, but the fact that the
state's bid evaluation selected the winning bidder for reason of lowest price
and a higher rating on all other factors, including system functionality."4 It was
not even a situation where the applicant was contending that another factor
should be more important than price.
The FCC overturned the USAC determination and remanded for further con-
sideration, but not due to the USAC's rather bizarre application of the new
standard. Rather, the FCC held the new standard to be inapplicable as the bid-
108 In re Request for Review of the Decision of the Universal Service Administrator for
Ysleta Independent School District, et al., Order, 18 F.C.C.R. 26,407, 10-81 (Dec. 4,
2003) (concluding that Ysleta and similarly situated applicants violated competitive bidding
and pricing requirements, but that waiving FCC filing deadlines to permit an appeal of
SLD's denial of funding was in the public interest).
109 Id. 49-50.
"o Id. at 26,429 n.138.
In re Request for Review Wyoming Department of Education Cheyenne, Wyoming,
Schools and Libraries Universal Service Support Mechanism, Order, CC Docket No. 02-6
(Feb. 28, 2006), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DA-06-485A1.pdf
[hereinafter Wyoming Order].
112 See Wyoming Department of Education, Request for Review, CC Docket No. 02-6, at
attachment 6 (Apr. 18, 2005) [hereinafter Wyoming Request for Review] (available via FCC
Electronic Filing System).
113 See Wyoming Order, supra note 111, 4, 7.
114 See Wyoming Request for Review, supra note 112, at attachments 4-5 (noting the
scores and comments for various proposals).
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ding process had been conducted before the Commission released the Ysleta
decision, and therefore looked "to the Tennessee Order for guidance."" 5 While
the FCC further noted its reliance on the fact the winning bid "represented the
lowest cost of the proposals submitted,"" 6 the decision nonetheless appears to
approve USAC's use of an administrative standard that is difficult to enforce
and can produce perverse results. As the House Subcommittee concluded, a
more effective bidding structure "is not simply a matter of mandating that price
should be considered the primary factor."'"7
V. WIDE AREA NETWORKS-THE WINDING ROAD TO ELIGIBILITY
In setting up the E-Rate program, the FCC established three broadly worded
categories of services and equipment eligible for funding: telecommunications
services; Internet access services; and local area network equipment within the
school, called "internal connection" equipment."8 The FCC designed this
package to enable schools and libraries to obtain both the basic services and
necessary equipment to deliver the services directly to the classroom.' By
express FCC rule, the cost of purchasing or building a wide area network
("WAN") that extends beyond the premises of the school to provide telecom-
munications service is ineligible for E-Rate funding.'20 The rule is cast only in
terms of a WAN used to provide telecommunications service; however, the
practical scope of the rule is more broad. In adopting the rule, the FCC also
cautioned that WAN facilities did "not appear to fall within the narrow provi-
"l Id. at 5.
116 Id. at 10.
"7 HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 5. More specifically, the Report rec-
ommended that "Congress should consider whether an adequate competitive bidding envi-
ronment could be better assured by incorporating relevant portions of the Federal Acquisi-
tion Regulations (FAR) to the E-rate program's rules and regulations." Id.
118 See H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 132 (1996) (Conf. Rep.); In re Federal-State Joint
Board on Universal Service, Access Charge Reform, Price Cap Performance Review for
Local Exchange Carriers, Transport Rate Structure and Pricing, End User Common Line
Charge, Fourth Order on Reconsideration in CC Docket No. 96-45, Report and Order in
CC Docket Nos. 96-45, 96-262, 91-213, 95-72, 13 F.C.C.R. 5318, 3 (Dec. 30, 1997) [here-
inafter Fourth Order on Reconsideration] ("[The Commission established federal universal
service support mechanisms to] provide schools and libraries with discounts on all commer-
cially available telecommunications services, Internet access, and internal connections.").
"9 See H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 132. For example, a local area network ("LAN") suffi-
ciently delivers the telecommunications and Internet access services to schools. See Fourth
Order on Reconsideration, supra note 118, 210 (ensuring available discounts for internal
connections, if the school district office is used as the LAN hub for all the schools in the
district connecting through the district office's internal connections).
120 See 47 C.F.R. § 54.518 (2005) ("To the extent that states, schools, or libraries build or
purchase a wide area network to provide telecommunications services, the cost of such wide
area networks shall not be eligible for universal service discounts .... ).
[Vol. 14
Reforming the E-Rate Program
sion that allows support for access to the Internet because WANs provide
broad-based telecommunications."' 2
While the distinction between local area network equipment and WAN
equipment is sometimes vague and the same piece of equipment often can be
configured to operate in either context, the principle is clear. Both the FCC and
USAC have endeavored to demark with precision the extent to which network-
ing equipment will be considered an eligible internal connection, based both on
location and function. 2
2
Furthermore, in response to requests from particular state-sponsored tele-
communications networks, the FCC ruled early in the life of the program that
such state networks did not qualify as a "telecommunications carrier" eligible
to directly receive E-Rate funding for telecommunications services provided to
schools because of their limited clientele.'23 Rather, the FCC ruled that such
state networks were only eligible: (1) to act as a consortia for individual
schools in the purchase of telecommunications services from an eligible tele-
communications carrier; and (2) to "secure direct reimbursements for their
provision of eligible discounted non-telecommunications services (i.e., Internet
121 Fourth Order on Reconsideration, supra note 118, 193. In the first Tennessee case,
while declining to place significant weight on this factor "out of concern that a WAN such
as this could be used to provide telecommunications service," the FCC noted that the net-
work will be used by Tennessee only for Internet access services. 1999 Tennessee Order,
supra note 90, 30.
122 See, e.g., Fourth Order on Reconsideration, supra note 118; In re Request for Re-
view of the Decision of the Universal Service Administrator by Arkansas Department of
Correction School District, Order, 17 F.C.C.R. 7100 (Apr. 22, 2002); In re Request for Re-
view of the Decision of the Universal Service Administrator by Southeast Webster Commu-
nity Schools, Order, 17 F.C.C.R. 11,122 (June 14, 2002); see also Schools and Libraries
Support Mechanism for Fund Year 2006, Eligible Services List (Nov. 22, 2005),
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/FCC-05-197A2.pdf (detailing the ser-
vices available for E-Rate funding in the 2006 school year).
123 See Fourth Order on Reconsideration, supra note 118, 554; In re Federal-State
Joint Board on Universal Service, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 7170
(Sept. 30, 1999) [hereinafter Washington Petition] (determining the petition of various
Washington state entities that "state telecommunications networks are not eligible to receive
discounts directly from the universal service support mechanism"). The Commission's rul-
ing that Iowa's state network did not qualify as a "telecommunications carrier" was subse-
quently reversed and remanded by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit. In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Declaratory Ruling, 14
F.C.C.R. 3040 (Jan. 29, 1999); Iowa v. FCC, 218 F.3d 756 (D.C. Cir. 2000). On remand, the
Commission determined, based on the specific facts presented, that the Iowa state network
was a common carrier eligible for direct support. In re Federal-State Joint Board on Univer-
sal Service, Order on Remand, 16 F.C.C.R. 571 (Dec. 21, 2000) [hereinafter Federal-State
Joint Board on Universal Service Order on Remand], aff'd, U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC,
295 F.3d 1326 (D.C. Cir. 2002). In making this determination, the Commission indicated its
expectancy that other state networks could be eligible for similar treatment, if the required
showing could be made. See In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service Order on
Remand, supra, 16.
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access and internal connections) to schools and libraries."'24
However, in actual practice, the situation has proven to be different. Under
present USAC policy, E-Rate funding is available for leasing, but not the pur-
chase, of a WAN and equipment-apparently for both telecommunications and
Internet access use, because USAC policy makes no distinction.'25 While the
USAC policy is cast in terms of the leasing of services, rather than the pur-
chase of equipment, this is a somewhat legalistic distinction without substantial
meaning.
The Tennessee situation illustrates how the USAC policy came about.
USAC had initially denied Tennessee's request for funding, finding that "pur-
chased WAN components are not eligible for support."'26 The requested fund-
ing involved charges for the construction of network point of presence facili-
ties, also known as "Educational Hub sites," at various locations throughout
the state to be used for routing of Internet access traffic to schools.'27 More
specifically, funding was sought for the entire cost of equipment and other fa-
cility construction costs as up-front, non-recurring charges, similar to an initial
installation charge for the provision of Internet access service.
Framing the issue as "whether Tennessee essentially requested discounts for
the purchase of ineligible facilities or eligible services," the FCC overruled
USAC and directed the grant of funding in a long and somewhat labored dis-
cussion.'28 On one hand, the FCC was "somewhat concerned about the level of
the nonrecurring charges" for the purchase of WAN equipment and "troubled"
by the effect of a decision to grant funding.'29 Such funding was not an antici-
pated component of the program: "[w]hen we started this program, we did not
envision providing support to fund significantly the backbone of a provider's
network."'3 ° The FCC also recognized the natural incentive for applicants to
call something otherwise ineligible by a different name in order to obtain fund-
ing, as well as the difficulties in drawing a "line between end-to-end Internet
124 Washington Petition, supra note 123, 3-4.
125 See Universal Service Administrative Company, Wide Area Network (WAN) Fact
Sheet, http://www.sl.universalservice.org/reference/wan.asp (last visited Feb. 5, 2005).
126 1999 Tennessee Order, supra note 90, 25. More specifically, because the classifica-
tion of some of the requested equipment was in dispute, USAC alternatively found that even
if viewed as internal connection equipment (i.e., local area network equipment), it could not
be funded because Tennessee did not meet the funding cap limit for internal connection
equipment. Id.
127 See id.
128 See id. 26.
129 Id. 33, 42.
130 Id. 42. It should be noted that the FCC never determined the precise extent to which
network equipment and construction costs would be E-Rate funded. While presuming the
amount to be substantial for decisional purposes (i.e., the non-recurring up-front charges are
greater than the recurring charges), the FCC's Order notes substantial dispute in the record
and does not attempt to resolve the question. Id. 33.
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access service and internal connections because Internet service providers con-
figure their networks and services differently."' 3
But, in the end, these concerns failed to carry the day. Rather, the FCC re-
lied on the absence of any evidence showing that the state would have an ex-
clusive right to use the networking equipment or any ownership interest in the
equipment."' Even though the cost of statewide WAN facilities would be fully
funded up-front and open to use by other parties, the FCC saw no problem with
the arrangement. After all, a service provider should be reasonably expected to
"include some portion of the cost of facilities .. . within the charges for provid-
ing Internet access service .... ""'
The reasoning is superficial and elevates form over substance. While it is an
economic truism that a service charge will include the service provider's costs
of providing the service, this does not mean that the E-Rate program may fund
the entire cost of construction of WAN facilities under the guise of an Internet
access service charge. However, rather than examine the true economic nature
of the transaction, the FCC relied upon economic platitudes. It did not even
attempt, for example, to ascertain the components of the substantial up-front
charges, whether all or only a substantial portion of the cost of the WANs fa-
cilities that were being funded.
Similarly, the FCC's reliance on the absence of a contract-based exclusive
right to network facilities and an ownership interest in the facilities both un-
wisely evaluated only the form, rather than the substance, of the arrange-
ment. " 4 At issue were custom-designed WAN facilities configured to meet the
express and unique needs of the state and entirely paid for by the state using E-
Rate funding.'35 The FCC, however, solely relied on the form of the arrange-
ment in making its decision: "even if Tennessee were [Educational Networks
of America's] only customer, that fact alone does not prove that Tennessee has
an exclusive right to use the network.' 3 6
If truly multiple user network facilities were involved, a different E-Rate
funding question should have been raised but was not. Where equipment or
facilities are used both for eligible E-Rate and other purposes, the school is
required to apportion its application for E-Rate funding and may receive fund-
ing only to the extent of eligible E-Rate use.'37 For example, if networking
131 Id. 35. In this respect, the FCC actually had two reasons to be concerned, as a fund-
ing request for Internet access service could be used to mask funding for either ineligible
WAN equipment or ineligible internal connection equipment on school premises.
131 See id. 37-38.
33 Id. T 29.
134 See id.
131 See id.
136 Id. 32.
137 See 42 U.S.C. § 254(h)(1) (2000); HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note I, at
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equipment is used only 50% of the time for eligible Internet access purposes
and 50% for ineligible purposes, only 50% of the cost of the equipment would
be eligible for E-Rate funding support.'38 However, the reasoning used by the
FCC went both ways, relying on purported non-exclusive use for one purpose,
while assuming exclusive use for the other.
The decision represents a lost opportunity to fashion clear and forthright
policies regarding WAN facilities. Rather than face the issue directly, the FCC
started down the path of basing fundability on a series of legalistic distinctions
that, to a fair degree, are out of touch with the real world. The consequences of
this decision are unreasonable given that support will not be provided for
schools to build or operate WANs but can be provided to a third party to build
the very same network for the school. Even though E-Rate funding paid for the
entire cost of the network, the school cannot own the equipment. While the
network is custom-designed to serve the needs of one entity, the school or li-
brary cannot contract for an exclusive right to use the network. However, the
network is not actually required to have other users to qualify for funding.
This is not to argue against E-Rate funding for the operation of WANs. In-
stead, particularly for large school districts, WANs can be a much needed com-
ponent within the E-Rate program. Still, rather than force schools into certain
service models that sometimes can be quite artificial, schools should have the
additional option of direct network ownership and operation. Some schools
may prefer a true service arrangement from an established service provider,
while others may prefer direct network operation. By allowing no options, the
present policy, if anything, serves only to encourage trickery and artful
schemes.
If WAN equipment can be leased, is there a valid reason why it may not be
purchased? The answer is that there is no good reason. Originally, the FCC
held that funding for WANs was outside the pale of the E-Rate program be-
cause, from a legal perspective, they were not perceived to meet the statutory
definition of services eligible for support. Such networks were neither an eligi-
ble telecommunications activity nor eligible internal connection equipment.39
Nor were they fundable for just Internet access, given their inherent bandwidth
ability to be used for other telecommunications functions.
What the FCC ignored, however, is that "broad authority" exists under §
254(h)(2) to fund equipment and other services necessary to connect class-
rooms and libraries.4 ' At least from the statutory construction standpoint, net-
19-24.
138 See Cost Allocation Guidelines for Products and Services,
http:///www.universalservice.org/sl/applicants/step06/cost-alocation-guidelines-products-
services.aspx (last visited Feb. 5, 2006) (providing examples of cost allocation methods).
139 See Fourth Order on Reconsideration, supra note 118, 182.
140 See In re Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service Order on Remand, supra
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work equipment is network equipment regardless of whether it is internal to
the school or located elsewhere along the chain. Rather than face this question,
however, both the FCC and USAC have proceeded to do indirectly what they
could not do directly through a continuing series of legal fictions in which only
the purchase of Internet access service and lease of equipment are being
funded.
VI. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
With escalating stories of fraudulent and wasteful practices, numerous sug-
gestions for program reform have been offered, with some already imple-
mented. Suggested reforms have included such changes as more stringent pre-
grant certification requirements, more post-grant audits, on-site inspections, the
elimination of funding for internal connection equipment, and an increase in
the present 10% minimum local share obligation.'4 Relatively minor changes
like these may be of some help, but to be truly effective, reform needs to cut
deeper. If present certification requirements have not deterred illicit practices,
for example, adventurous parties will probably pay no greater attention to more
strongly worded language. Audits can no doubt be effective in uncovering
fraudulent practices after the fact, as well as providing an essential program
integrity component, but they are time-consuming and expensive for such a
large program, and the recovery of funds after money is dispersed can be both
a difficult and frustrating process. Accordingly, audits should not be viewed as
a panacea for effective and prudent program management before funds are dis-
bursed.
In particular, two more fundamental program flaws should take priority
status. First and foremost, the program needs an effective "hands on" manage-
ment structure that combines both policy and administrative matters into an
integrated structure with clear lines of responsibility and accountability, an
organizational structure that can respond quickly and decisively to issues as
they arise. The FCC has recognized the need for more effective management
and is now in a comprehensive rulemaking proceeding exploring ways in
which the program should be restructured, including the possible replacement
of USAC with an outside contractor.'42 This review is a welcome development,
but the FCC needs to appreciate that the simple substitution of one outside
party for another as program administrator, standing alone, is not likely to
solve the problem. Rather, the primary focus needs to be on the underlying
management structure and how, as the policy maker, the FCC, can effectively
note 123, at 591.
14 See, e.g., HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 3-5.
142 See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
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oversee and manage program administration on a day-to-day basis. Where pol-
icy-making ends and administration begins is, at best, a very grey area. Often,
in the context of a particular matter, the two are so intertwined as to be insepa-
rable into two organizations with different managers and imperfect lines of
responsibility between the two.
This is particularly true given the vagueness of FCC program rules, a rapidly
changing technological environment, and the complexity of many technology
acquisition projects for which funding is sought. The FCC should not expect
that the program may be simply outsourced to an independent body after the
program rules are established, but rather must design an integrated manage-
ment structure that provides effective "hands on" FCC management, including
the allocation of sufficient internal staffing to accomplish the job.'43
Each year, over 40,000 applications for E-Rate funding must be processed
over a relatively short time span. To accomplish this, USAC presently out-
sources much of the actual day-to-day work to electronic data processing com-
panies.' 4  The resulting process tends to focus too much on the form of the ap-
plication rather than the substance of the request. While some of the informa-
tion technology procurements reviewed by USAC are probably as complicated
as a major Pentagon weapons procurement, the present E-Rate application
process is more appropriate for the purchase of simple off-the-shelf products
that have an established and easily ascertainable price. As a result, an innocent
school that places an incorrect address on the application form when requesting
a few thousand dollars to pay its telephone bill probably has a greater risk of
denial than a multi-million dollar scheme organized by potentially fraudulent
parties such as in the San Francisco situation.'45
Again, the ongoing saga of the Tennessee case serves to illustrate the pre-
sent lack of an effective management structure with clear lines of responsibility
and accountability. Since the FCC's original decision in 1999, the contract
award has come under criminal scrutiny by a federal grand jury in Tennes-
143 Inadequate staffing resources have bedeviled the E-Rate program from the start.
While the program was set up with the laudable goal of keeping administrative costs as low
as possible through automated electronic data processing procedures, this must be balanced
with the need for effective management of a multi-billion dollar per-year grant program. In
this respect, USAC has typically spent from two to three percent of overall E-Rate program
costs on program administration, which is probably less than that spent by most charitable
organizations managing substantial grant programs. See USAC 2004 ANNUAL REPORT, Su-
pra note 61, at 22-23. See generally GAO REPORT, supra note 29. Also, according to the
GAO, FCC staffing levels supporting the program have been low, ranging from 8.8 to 19.5
full-time equivalent positions per fiscal year. Id. at app. IV.
144 See, e.g., UNIVERSAL SERVICE ADMIN. Co., 2001 ANNUAL REPORT,
http://www.universalservice.org/about/govemance/annual-reports/2001/pg4.html.
145 See HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 22-24.
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see. 146 As part of an ongoing investigation into alleged corruption in the award-
ing of public contracts during this period, the grand jury indicted the founder
and CEO of the winning bidder in November 2004 for obstruction of justice.
This individual is currently awaiting trial for the alleged destruction of evi-
dence sought by the grand jury.'47 Due to the ongoing grand jury investigation,
in late 2002, USAC put a hold on further funding. Thereafter, the state pleaded
for relief under the so-called "good samaritan policy." This policy allows for
the designation of a substitute service provider for the sole purpose of receiv-
ing funding for disbursement to other entities providing service. In 2003, the
FCC directed USAC to "process Tennessee's Funding Year 2002 application
and, if appropriate, disburse funds to the designated Good Samaritan provider"
in order to maintain operation of the state's network.48 No funds, however,
were to be disbursed to ENA, including the payment of salaries of thirty-seven
ENA employees responsible for the operation of the network.'49
The implementation of the FCC's Order proved difficult for USAC. In early
2005, Tennessee again approached the FCC and requested emergency relief,
disagreeing with USAC's implementation of the FCC's 2003 Order in two re-
spects. 5 First, Tennessee challenged USAC's determination to disallow fund-
ing for equipment and services provided by subcontractors that were ineligible
for funding directly, but would be eligible indirectly if included as a compo-
nent of the overall Internet access service provided by the prime contractor. 5'
Second, the state disputed USAC's practice to pay only the portion of the sub-
contractor's invoice that was specifically matched to a payment of the state's
146 See Friends in High Places: Agents Raid ENA Offices, Seize Files, NewsChan-
nel5.com (Dec. 20, 2002), http://www.newschannel5.com/content/ investigates/t036.asp
(reporting on the raid by federal and state agents of the ENA offices in Nashville, possibly
in connection with the long-term contracts to continue Internet services with Tennessee
schools).
147 See Friends in High Places: Sundquist Friend Indicted for Obstruction, NewsChan-
nel5.com (Nov. 4, 2004), http://www.newschannel5.com/content/investigates/7737.asp (re-
porting on the indictment of ENA founder Al Ganier, and whether his relationship with then
Governor Don Sundquist assisted in ENA's being awarded with millions in state contracts).
148 In re Request for Immediate Relief Filed by the State of Tennessee, Order, 18
F.C.C.R. 13,581, 24 (July 2, 2003) [hereinafter 2003 Tennessee Order].
149 See id. 20-21. As detailed in the Order, 61% of the overall cost of network opera-
tion goes to subcontractors providing telecommunications and other supporting services,
18% goes to pay ENA employees responsible for the operation of the state's network and
the remaining 21% goes to ENA for other expenses, costs, and overhead. Id. at 13,584 nn.
18-19.
150 See In re Petition for Clarification and Emergency Relief by Department of Educa-
tion, State of Tennessee; Schools and Libraries Universal Service Support Mechanism, Or-
der, 20 F.C.C.R. 10,923 (June 22, 2005) [hereinafter Petition for Clarification]. Tennessee
filed a Motion to Withdraw its Petition for Clarification on June 6, 2005, which the FCC
granted in the June 22, 2005 Order.
51 See 2003 Tennessee Order, supra note 148, at 13,587.
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30% share of the overall price to the particular subcontractor." 2 The issues
raised illustrate both the illusion of the program-eligibility dependant on the
name attached rather than the substance of the transaction-and the difficulty
in realistically maintaining a separation between program policy interpretation
and administration. Also, the practical effect was substantial. According to the
state's petition, over $38 million was at stake in the disputed USAC adminis-
trative determinations in E-Rate funding for a two-year period.5 3 It further re-
ported that the indicted individual had resigned as an ENA employee, officer,
and director.
The FCC never acted upon the state's petition. Instead, in March and Sep-
tember 2005, USAC granted over $47 million in funding for program years
2002, 2003, and 2004 to Tennessee for Internet access service provided by the
prime contractor ENA. 5 4 In withdrawing its request for FCC clarification of
the July 2003 Order, Tennessee reported in June 2005 that special relief from
the FCC was no longer necessary as "USAC has begun to release E-Rate fund-
ing again for the state's schools in its normal course" pursuant to a USAC ad-
ministrative policy regarding the treatment of entities under investigation that
was first released in November 2003.'
It is unascertainable how this exactly transpired, as USAC operations and
decision-making are largely non-transparent to the public. From all outward
signs, however, it appears difficult to square the action with both the FCC's
2003 Order-presumably the highest authority in the matter-and USAC's
own statement of principles which states rather unequivocally that funding will
be deferred in cases where "persons associated with the entity under investiga-
tion have been arrested or criminal charges have been made .... ."56 Whatever
the answer, these apparent inconsistencies and the convoluted way in which
152 See Petition for Clarification, supra note 150, 11 ("USAC does not require Service
Providers, such as AOL for example, to allocate payments, or even to make payments, in
any fashion, or even disclose to competitors how its service is operating and with what sup-
pliers. However, in the current situation, USAC is carrying the Service Provider allocation
down to remote levels to sub vendors, for example.").
' See id. 4.
154 Universal Service Administrative Company, Funding Commitment Data,
http://www.sl.universalservice.org/Contentlnc/funding/previous.asp (last visited Feb. 22,
2006) (detailing state funding reports and cumulative national data for Funding Years 1998-
2005).
155 See In re Petition for Clarification, Department of Education, State of Tennessee;
Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service; Changes in the Board of Directors of the
National Exchange Carrier Association, Inc., Withdrawal of Petition for Clarification and
Emergency Relief by Department of Education, State of Tennessee, CC Docket No. 96-45, at
3 (June 6, 2002) (available via FCC Electronic Comment Filing System); Universal Service
Administrative Company, Principles of Treating Entities Under Investigation Relating to
their Participation in the Schools an Libraries Universal Service Support Mechanism (2003)
[hereinafter USAC PRINCIPLES], http://sl.universalservice.org/reference/investigation.asp.
156 USAC PRINCIPLES, supra note 155, 9b.
[Vol. 14
Reforming the E-Rate Program
the decisions appear to have transpired emphasize the need for greater clarity
on who is doing what in the management and administration of the E-Rate pro-
gram.
Additionally, the artificiality of certain aspects of the funding process must
give way to procedures which mirror sound business practices and established
procurement procedures that schools would naturally follow if they were
spending their own money. Three aspects stand out in particular: (1) where the
money actually goes; (2) realistic standards that do not force schools into un-
usual procurement arrangements just to satisfy the "form" required by the pro-
gram; and (3) effective competitive bidding requirements.
Under the existing grant distribution process, funding is paid directly to the
vendor, rather than flowing to the school. The reason is highly legalistic, re-
sulting largely from the original structure of the universal service program as a
discount mechanism among telecommunications carriers under which the car-
rier "discounted" a service to the favored class of customers and then recov-
ered that discount through an offsetting reduction in its required payment into
the USF. The customer originally received only a subsidized service as op-
posed to a funding grant requiring responsible administration on its part. This
antiquated concept does not reflect the realties of the present process in which,
except for telecommunications services, funds are now directly paid to the
vendor for goods or services provided to the school. It "lessens applicants'
control over work performed and diffuses responsibility and accountability for
program integrity ... .""' From a practical business standpoint, distributing the
funds directly to the school for inclusion in its normal budgeting and account-
ing procedures, and then holding the school fully accountable for its spending
would probably contribute more to overall program ntegrity than any other
single measure.
Similarly, requiring schools to structure procurement transactions in a cer-
tain way invites suspect arrangements. There is no better example of this than
the present WAN policy that compels the leasing of equipment from a third
party, even though the school might otherwise prefer to own and operate the
equipment itself.'8 The annual filing window process has also led to an un-
healthy "Oklahoma Land Rush" mentality encouraging applicants to stake
claims by the close of the filing window. If left to their normal procurement
practices, schools and libraries nationwide would utilize a broad variety of pro-
curement practices and project schedules driven by their particular local needs
and requirements. By imposing a uniform nationwide filing window for fund-
ing each year, the present E-Rate process unwisely encourages the local appli-
cant to ignore its normal way of doing business and usual facilities develop-
"' HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 3.
158 See discussion supra note 19.
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ment process.
Finally, "the program needs a much more robust competitive bidding struc-
ture than it currently possesses, in order to ensure that E-rate funds support the
highest per-dollar value possible."'59 Even with the renewed emphasis on low-
est price as the primary bidding factor, the process as shown by Wyoming's
difficulties is far from adequate. Simply mandating that schools shall seek
competitive bids through a web posting process that often does not really dis-
close what the school is actually seeking, along with requiring a waiting period
of twenty-eight days before entering into a contract does not mean that that
competitive bids will actually be received and carefully evaluated, particularly
where there are no hard standards or process to follow. Government procure-
ment practices, particularly for complex technology contracts, are far more
detailed and complex process and require far more direction and control.
VII. CONCLUSION
Any multi-billion dollar grant program carries with it natural incentives for
parties to abuse the system. These incentives are heightened where the pro-
gram is open-ended as to the dollars that can be obtained, unclear as to exactly
what types of equipment and services are eligible for funding, and involve the
acquisition and operation of large and extremely complex information technol-
ogy systems.
This is not to say that the present distributional system has failed in all
cases. That seems to be far from the case. Most applicants no doubt have ap-
proached the process honestly. A fair number of the growing "violations of
program rules" now being noted are really no more than honest mistakes made
by parties, such as the Our Lady of Refuge school in the Bronx, caught up in
the snares of a cumbersome process that is difficult to navigate.
The recent and widespread public accounts of fraud, corruption, and crimi-
nal convictions have probably done more to scare away some potential schem-
ers and clean up blatantly abusive practices than the tightening of regulations
to date and the threat of more post-grant audits. To complement this, there
needs to be a far greater level of sophistication and business acumen in the
overall management of the program and, in particular, the initial grant process.
Given the evidence to date of significant criminal activities and other fraudu-
lent schemes within the E-Rate program, more than piecemeal solutions are
required at this point to ensure future program viability and integrity.
159 HOUSE SUBCOMMITEE REPORT, supra note 1, at 5.
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